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Abstract 
 
Leveraged buyout transaction is the most familiar PE investment technique in financial 
market. It is controversial for high debt financing since some companies go to bankruptcy for 
it, and some companies achieve another boom. Debt financing is cheaper than equity 
financing, and tax shield would also be attractive for choice of high debt capital structure. 
Potential LBO companies should be mature, stable cash generation since high debt induces 
high interest payment. Thus cash flow plays important role in LBO transaction, many 
company goes to bankruptcy due to interest payment delay.  
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Introduction: 
Private Equity (PE) is also called buyout fund which is helping some companies to develop 
business except for traditional bank loan. Generally, PE investments are mainly including 
Venture Capital, Buyout funds and Mezzanine capital. We can distinguish between Buyout 
fund and Venture Capital by exit strategy.  
 
During 1980s, PE was growing very fast due to the improvement in financial technique and 
credit risk management.1 LBO was defined as a legend in financial market since it achieved 
over 1400 “privatization” deals. The most significant deal was Wometco2 in 1984 which 
successful finished the first over $1 billion leveraged buyout transaction for its corporate 
restructuring. Before this transaction, most corporate raiders only applied LBO for small size 
companies due to conservative investment principle. Thus, investors began to look for large 
size companies as potential LBO transaction.3 For example, in 1989 there were $76.5 billion 
for 20 LBOs4, which shown that each transaction was $3.8 billion on averaged, and it was 
larger than previous transactions. Meanwhile, corporate raiders found company could gain tax 
benefit from high debt financing due to revolution of tax law. However, LBO was still a new 
financial technique since investors did not have much experience and research on this area 
study. Fund raisers only paid attention on tax benefit of high debt financing, they did not 
realize that high debt would easily induce high probability of financial distress due to high 
interest payment. Thus high debt financing company would be more risk on project selection 
since they need stable cash flow for interest payment in every certain period. If project were 
failure, company would decrease predictability of cash flow, and they would have high 
probability to delay interest payment. From 1989 to 1992, the world economic was in the 
recession, there were 31 companies’ bankruptcy since they did not have cash flow for debt 
                                                        
1 Gaughan, V. (1999) “Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructureings”. 2nd Ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
ISBN: 0-471-31670-9.  Ch. 7,  PP. 291-326 
2 Wometco Enterprises Inc. a television company in USA.  
3 We research the first over $1 billion LBO transaction from internet source: http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/Leveraged_Buyout 
t 
4 We collect the data for LBO transaction in 1989 from internet source: http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/Leveraged_Buyout 
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obligation, and these LBO transaction involved in more than $27 billion total debts.5  
 
But financial market does not abandon LBO, and investors cumulate a lot of experience from 
its failure. Today the private equity market is approximately one-sixth the size of the 
commercial bank loan in terms of outstanding 6 , especially leveraged buyout market 
development,  it has entered the another new boom period7.  
Purpose of study: 
We found that leveraged buyout connects with several different areas of macro-economics, 
corporate governance and corporate finance. So we are really curious what are drivers and 
consequences for the increased activity in the LBO today? In this paper, we are going to use 
three steps to explore LBO transaction.  
 
Step 1: We will introduce private equity market which includes definition, development, and 
characteristic of PE. In this part, we hope readers could have a general idea about PE fund 
since LBO is one of the most important investment techniques in PE fund. Thus we could 
build an initial impression for LBO transaction in terms of introduction of PE.   
 
Step 2: We will introduce the detail of LBO transaction. This part consists of 6 sections which 
are LBO structure, exit strategy, motivation, factors for a successful LBO, and negative 
impact on LBO. We are going to construct common sense on LBO transaction, in order to 
infer drivers and consequence for LBO transaction. 
 
Step 3: From the last step, we found drivers of LBO could be traced by capital structure, and 
financial situation would be influenced by high debt capital structure. In this part, we would 
firstly adopt M&M theory to analyze high debt capital structure in order to figure out 
                                                        
5 “During 1990s world economic recession, there are a lot of LBO companies went to bankruptcy due to interest payment 
delay…” pick up from internet source: http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/Leveraged_Buyout 
6 Vinten, F. & Thomsen, S. (2008) “A Review of Private Equity.” Working Paper no. 1, 2008. Copenhagen Business School. 
7 we trace LBO development which is from internet source: http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/Leveraged_Buyout 
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advantage and disadvantage of LBO transaction. And then, we are going to focus on cash 
flow of company since high debt financing company is required stable cash flow for its 
interest payment. At last, we will conclude the optimal debt structure in terms of trade-off 
theory since we want to remind company should evaluate their debt capability before 
adopting LBO transaction.   
 
Here, we are going to use the deductive method to explain problem formulation in this thesis. 
All the theoretical analysis will base on the existing literature study, which includes relevant 
reports, books, journals, articles and E-sources. 
Problem formulation: 
This paper is trying to figure out what are drivers for LBO, and what are the financial 
consequences of the transaction? 
 
High debt financing would induce high probability of financial distress, but there are still a lot 
of companies adopting LBO transaction for business development. According to Pecking 
order theory, debt financing is cheaper than equity financing. Meanwhile, company could gain 
tax benefit from high debt capital structure. High debt would require stable cash flow to pay 
its interest payment in every certain period, so company would be risky to choose business 
project since project’s success or failure would influence cash flow generation. From the 
introduction above, we know many LBO companies went to bankruptcy during 1989 to 1992 
of world economic recession, and it was due to interest payment delay. We are really 
interested about drivers of LBO transaction, and what kind of financial consequence would be 
under the condition of high debt capital structure.  
Limitation: 
In this paper, we are not going to do an empirical analysis due to limited information. There is 
not the explanation of economic climate, although LBO can be affected by their external 
environment. 
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Chapter 1: Private equity market 
In this chapter, we will present a general background to leveraged buyout, and explain the key 
fundamentals of the transaction and some of the trends in the market.  
Private equity becomes a hot topic day by day, and you can see it on every famous financial 
magazine’s front page frequently. It is the legend of capital market as well as a controversial 
financing. Superficially, private equity and hedge fund look like twins. But they have 
significantly difference characters under surface. Hedge fund is typically doing short term 
investment, such as short-term speculation. Vinten & Thomsen (2008)8 mention, although 
hedge fund tries to influence corporate governance as activist investor, they would not have 
any voting right within ownership Company. Private equity does, they are generally in control 
more than 50% shares of the target firm  
1.1 Definition of private equity 
 “Private equity is not quoted on a public exchange. Private equity consists of investors 
and funds that make investments directly into private companies or conduct buyouts of 
public companies that result in a delisting of public equity. Capital for private equity is 
raised from retail and institutional investors, and can be used to fund new technologies, 
expand working capital within an owned company, make acquisitions, or to strengthen a 
balance sheet.” (Source from http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/privateequity.asp) 
In a broad sense, Private Equity investment includes all the stages of development within a 
company before their initial public offer (IPO).  The stages of development can be typically 
divided into eight stages: (1) Seed financing, (2) Start-Up, (3) Early Development, (4) 
Expansion, (5) Profitable but Cash Poor, (6) Rapid Growth toward Liquidity point, (7) Bridge 
stage, and (8) Harvest. 9  Thus, PE investment could be involved in Venture Capital 
(Development Capital), leveraged buyout, Mezzanine Capital, turnaround, Pre-IPO, private 
investment in public equity (PIPE), distressed debt, and real estate, in terms of venture 
                                                        
8 Vinten, F. & Thomsen, S. (2008) “A Review of Private Equity.” Working Paper no. 1, 2008. Copenhagen Business School. 
9  This definition is based on book: Ogden, J. (2002) Advance Corporate Finance: policy and strategy. 1st edition, Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, cop. ISBN: 0-13-091568-8.  Ch. 16.  PP. 571 
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development and financing,10 
 
However, venture capital and leveraged buyout are mainly representing private equity 
industry due to their distinct characters. Venture capital is a traditional investment in small 
private companies for financing start-up firms with potential growth. Normally, venture 
capitalist will get the return through IPO or trade sale in their invested company and their 
fund are formed by institutional investors and wealthy individual. Prowse (1998)11 mentions 
many young companies could not reach the requirement for bank loan, so enterprisers would 
adopt venture capitals for business development. But leveraged buyout prefers mature 
companies which are under performing with high levels of free cash flow, i.e, firms in the 
cash-cow industry.  
 
In a narrow term, PE focuses on the mature companies who have accumulated considerable 
experience in the market place, and have stable cash flow, but unfavorable opportunities for 
the long-term development, so Buyout funds and Mezzanine Capital primarily represent 
Private Equity.12  
 
Chart 1: Private Equity 
 
(Source: http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/Private_equity) 
                                                        
10 Vinten, F. & Thomsen, S. (2008) “A Review of Private Equity.” Working Paper no. 1, 2008. Copenhagen Business 
school.  
11 Prowse, S. D. (1998) “The economics of the private equity market”. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Economic Review 
the 3rd Quarter 1998, ISSN: 07321414,  pp.21-35 
12 This definition collect from book: Ogden, J. (2002) Advance Corporate Finance: policy and strategy. 1st edition, Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, cop. ISBN: 0-13-091568-8.  Ch. 16.  
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1.2 Development of private equity market 
Private equity is a relatively new concept to the financial world. There have been major 
epochs marked by three boom and bust cycles13. As classified by the academic professionals, 
these booms are respectively 1. 1982-1993;   2. 1992-2002;  3. 2003-before subprime. 
 
Each of the above periods has specific contexts behind the rapid growing private equity 
industry. The 1st boom was due to a dramatic surge in leveraged buyout activity financed by 
junk bonds and culminating in the massive buyout of RJR Nabisco. The 2nd boom emerged as 
a result of recovery of the recession in the early 1990s marked as crisis of loan and savings 
and collapse of real estates. It ended as soon as Nasdaq dot.com bubble had busted. The 3rd 
boom is somewhat having the similar path of the 2nd boom-bust cycle as it started from the 
ashes of the dot.com relics and reach enormous size and becoming institutionalized such as 
Blackstone, whose IPO was successfully done in the U.S, 2007. However, subprime crisis 
swept the financial world suddenly, private equities also got affected and leverage buyout 
activities are not as profitable as it was during the past 5 years. 
 
By tracing private equity market development, we found private equity investment is tightly 
connected with the global macroeconomic context, especially leveraged buyout transaction. 
Large multi-billion USD buyouts were highly financed by the high yield debt. According the 
statistics, the Carlyle Group, Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe, along with other private 
investors, led a $7.5 billion buyout of QwestDex, not to even speaking about the buyouts of 
Dollarama(2004), The Hertz Corporation (2005), Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (2005) and SunGard 
(2005)14.  
1.3 The characteristic of Private equity 
Private equity firms are looking for capital from a few wealthy individuals, institutional 
investors and other accredited investors through private contacts. Therefore, they do not need 
                                                        
13 We research development of PE from internet: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_private_equity_and_venture_capital 
14 This data picks up from internet source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_private_equity_and_venture_capital 
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to register with Security and Exchange Commission, and avoid attendance from regulation of 
securities market. Within private equity market, there are limited private equities offerings 
data for public. 
 
BVCA explanatory notes for limited partners agreement (2002) mentions that private equity 
funds are mainly organized by general partners (GPs) and limited partners (LPs). GPs work 
for management of PE funds, their responsibility generally involves in finding potential target 
company, making a plan for buyout process, and choosing exit strategy. Meanwhile, GPs need 
to handle corporate governance events, such as board work, management incentives. In order 
to motivate GPs hard working, they must join PE investment by personal money. Because 
there are not any explicit rule to require how much they should invest, GPs often contribute a 
small part of capital for investment. In contrast, the main private financing is from LPs. But 
they do not have voting right on management level. Prows (1998) mentions LPs are formed 
by wealthy individual, professional investors, banks, insurance companies, pension funds, 
hedge funds, and endowments or even public institutions. According to old school of 
investment, high risk bearing should be with high expected return. LPs shoulder large part of 
financing which are high risk bearing, but they only get a minor fraction of total return. This 
is often a controversial problem in PE investment.  
   
General partners are management level of private equity funds, so they are formed by a few 
members which compared with the number of limited partners. Meanwhile, GPs only provide 
small part of capital in company, each of them contributes less than the individual of LPs. 
Therefore, general partners getting a large amount of compensation for low risk bearing 
would be a controversial problem in PE investment. Prowse (1998) 15concludes that GPs fee 
are usually taking 1.5%-2.5% of asset plus extra interest of performance. For instance, we 
assume there are five GPs to manage $100 million assets, expected return is 15%, and the 
                                                        
15 Prowse, S. D. (1998) “The economics of the private equity market”. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Economic Review 
the 3rd Quarter 1998, ISSN: 07321414,  pp.21-35 
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actual ROI16 is 30%. Thus GPs will gain:$100 * 2.5% $100 * (30% 15%) $17million million million+ − =  , 
and then each member will earn $17 $3.4
5
million million= . About LPs’ compensation, they 
will be paid the return which has already deducted GPs fee from total return. As we assume 
above, the GPs fee is $17million, and total return is $100 *30% $30million million= . 
Therefore, LPs fee will be$30 $17 $13million million million− = , and the number of LPs is 
always larger than GPs. Here we assume there are 20 limited partners, so each LP will earn 
$13 $0.65
20
million million=  which is much lower than GPs.17 Why does general partner get 
much more compensation than limited partner? Actually, GPs compensation is mainly 
representing their salary payment. If company pays GPs’ salary as compensation, GPs could 
avoid paying tax of salary in terms of tax policy. Tax payment will be paid by company, and it 
is called tax of capital gain. Thus compensation for GPs is including return of investment and 
salary.  
 
PE fund normally invests in target companies for a certain period, and they would gain return 
of investment by exit strategies, such as IPO, trade sale, and merger & acquisition.18  This 
certain period will take 3 to 5 years19, or even more time, it must depend on whether target 
companies finish value creation.  Meanwhile, fund manager should report their performance 
during a period of time in order to build a trust between GPs and LPs. This reporting is very 
important for PE investment, because it would influence LPs for whether they should 
continuously support this project. Managers’ performance is crucial to attract the second 
financing for project, thus a high quality fund manager should be required in PE investment.  
Therefore, the manager of private equity funds should report performance to their LPs on 
schedule, in order to avoid information asymmetry.  
 
                                                        
16 ROI: return on investment, a performance measure used to evaluate the efficiency of an investment or to compare the 
efficiency of a number of different investments. 
17 This assumption is based on Vinten & Thomsen (2008) “A Review of Private Equity.” Working Paper no. 1, 2008. 
Copenhagen Business School 
18 See textbook: Povaly, s. (2007) Private Equity Exits. Ch. 4  PP. 182-209 
19 See textbook: Povaly, s. (2007) Private Equity Exits. Ch. 3  PP. 127-178 
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However, LPs would earn more risk premium than traditional securities due to high risk 
bearing. PE belongs to unlisted securities which mean there are not any public markets for 
private equity trade. If LPs wants to quit investment before expiration date, they should find 
another private investor to instead of, otherwise they would not get back initial investment 
fund until PE exits from project. Weak liquidity is weakness for PE investment. George, 
Liang and Prowse (1997) mention that LPs is very difficult to gain access to their money as it 
is closed down for long-term investment, the period is approximately 12 years.20 But the final 
year, LPs would get back initial fund and return of investment.  
Chapter 2:  Leverage buyouts 
This chapter will explain what types of firms are likely to be target candidates for a leveraged 
buyout, and what is the investment rationale or motivation in the deal. Then we will address 
the fundamental successful factors and critiques towards the LBO.   
Buyout transactions could be transformed to Management buyout, Management buy-in, 
Institutional buyouts, and Leveraged buyout. Generally, Leveraged buyout is mainly financed 
by bank loan to obtain the domination of a mature company, so financial institutions need to 
audit the assets of the LBO candidates and their cash flow, in order to evaluate whether this 
company has capability to adopt high debt financial restructuring.  
“Transaction that affects the ownership and control of a firm take many forms, including not 
only M&A and takeovers, but also several types of buyouts. If a buyout is facilitated in part by 
the issuance of debt claims against the focal firm’s assets, the transaction is called a 
leveraged buyout (LBO”).21(Ogden, Joseph P. Advanced corporate finance: policies and 
strategies. Chapter 16 Mergers, Acquisitions, Takeovers, and Buyouts, P571)  
 
The characteristics of LBO are primary high debt, incentive and private ownership. High debt 
often implicates high interest payment that is why LBO transaction prefers mature company 
which has stable cash flow generation. Meanwhile, PE fund mangers only focus on exploiting 
                                                        
20 Liang, N., Prowse, S., & George W. (1997) mention that LPs should typically involve in 10-13 years for private equity 
investment.   
21 Definition of LBO is from the book: Ogden, Joseph P. Advanced corporate finance: policies and strategies. Chapter 16 
Mergers, Acquisitions, Takeovers, and Buyouts,  P571 
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business area, creating company value and improving operation efficiency. During the period 
of LBO, company would be private ownership, even though it used to be the listed stock 
company, their stock would be stopped trade. After a few years, company creates more value 
from LBO, and they have capability to pay down debt. PE funds would consider to exit, 
company going public again, trade sales, and merger & acquisition are normally chose as 
“happy ending” of LBO transaction. And then, company would pay a “charming 
compensation” to reward PE fund managers’ hard working. 
2.1 Process of a typical LBO transaction 
Looking for deal source is the first step in LBO transaction, so PE fund manager is going to 
find out some LBO candidate companies. In order to choose a suitable candidate for LBO, we 
require fund manager’s diligence which is working hard on researching target firm. Normally, 
they would observe whether this target firm is legal existing, and then fund manager would 
figure out candidate’s current tax payment and financial situation in terms of financial annual 
report. Because high debt financing could reduce company’s tax payment which is the most 
attractive reason to adopt LBO, fund manager must calculate whether this tax shield could 
really help target firm development. However when they consider about tax shield benefit, he 
must observe company’s debt capability which could be traced by candidate financial 
performance. Choosing target firm is crucial to determine whether this LBO transaction 
would be successful or not, so you should be sure there are not any information asymmetries 
in research.  
 
After fund manager determines candidate for LBO transaction, they would make a plan for 
improving company’s business, and forecast the future financial performance in order to 
determine the potential expiration date for exit. When fund manager selects target firm for 
LBO transaction, they should construct an initial exit strategy in terms of current financial 
situation. Then PE fund manager would figure out how much financing will be invested in 
this transaction, they must determine new capital structure in this candidate company. 
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As we mention above, fund providers are formed by wealthy individual, bank, pension fund, 
insurance, hedge fund, and other public institution. When fund manager figure out the budge 
for this LBO transaction, they would negotiate with fund providers in order to acquire 
financial support. Bank loan is the primary source of acquisition financing which could follow 
fixed interest payment. And then, mezzanine debt would be the secondary financing source 
for LBO which is required higher expected return than bank loan. According to characteristic 
of mezzanine debt, it is often repaid when company is sold. Thus mezzanine debt bears much 
higher risk, and the risk premium would be comparatively higher than bank loan. In 
negotiation, fund manager must determine the final loan agreement which is flexible in 
expiration date. The loan agreement would be negotiable to extend the date for financial 
support in case LBO transaction could not achieve target performance within initial period. 
However fund manager should often report their performance during transaction, it can help 
investors to follow up their investment, and will be easier for the second financing. In Figure 
1, we have a clear view about a typical LBO structure. NewCo is representing PE firm which 
consists of general partners and limited partners. LBO is one of private equity investment 
techniques in financial market which is described by NewCo2. Responsibility of LBO fund 
manager is looking for Target for LBO transaction, and their financing is mainly from bank 
loan, mezzanine debt and other source. Banks will be senior loan in NewCo2, thus bank loan 
would be ranked before PE firm. Mezzanine debt and other sources are belonging to junior 
loan which is ranked after senior loan. Normally, PE firm and LBO fund may provide security 
for loans, but their assets are only the shares in LBO fund and Target firm respectively. If 
there were something going wrong in LBO transaction, the bank will get its money first. 
 
Fund manager would adjust capital structure of target after they have sufficient capital for 
LBO transaction, and they would process investment plan to create value adding. If company 
achieves final target performance in certain period, fund manager would push company 
exiting from LBO transaction. Otherwise, this transaction has to be extended expiration date. 
As we mention above, fund manager should construct an initial exit strategy when they 
determines target firm. This exit strategy would be changed due to variable economic 
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environment, thus fund manager should trace internal environment and external environment 
in order to find out the most beneficial exit strategy.    
 
 
Figure 1. Structure of a typical leveraged buyout 22 
 
2.2 Exit LBO 
During the period of LBO, the listed company would be the unlisted which means company 
will be stopped shares trade in the public stock market. Thus, PE funds would push this target 
company going public again in order to exit from LBO transaction, and gain the return of 
investment. This is the typical exit strategy for LBO companies which used to be the listed. 
The choice of exit strategy is important to determine how much return you will gain from this 
PE investment, funds managers would decide exit strategy according to company’s condition. 
Except for company going public again, there are flotation, trade sale, and share repurchasing 
as well.23  
                                                        
22Andersen, T. K. (2008) Buyout Transaction. Merc. Private equity and Hedge fund. Copenhagen of University. 25th May 
2008 
23See book: Povaly, s. (2007) Private Equity Exits: divestment process management for leveraged buyout. Heidelberg: 
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. ISBN: 9-78-3-540-70953-4. Ch.4  PP. 181-276 
NewCo Senior 
bank 
Junior 
bank 
NewCo 2 Seller 
Managem
ent
Investor 
Target 
Sub 3 Sub 2 Sub 1 
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z Floatation is initial public offer (IPO), and the original shareholders may choose to sell all 
or part of their shares, in hope of a substantial growth further into the future.  
z Trade sale is mainly used on companies which have no ability to issue IPO, but trade sale 
often gets the high price.  
z Share repurchasing is the rare way to exit. Company does not go public due to the 
management insisting on independence while a small group of investors wish to exit. 
Then they will purchase their shares from other new private investors. Typically, these 
kinds of share purchasing are private deals.  
z Going public again is also called refinancing, and company issues new shares to pay debt 
in order to completely quit LBO.  
 
A successful LBO investment based on when company should exit, and how to exit. Fund 
mangers often identify the scheduler of exiting from company’s internal and external 
environment, and try to gain return as high as possible. For internal environment observation, 
we focus on company annual financial report which reflects financial performance, and fund 
mangers would figure out whether company create value after LBO, and how much value are 
created. The suitable exit strategy is often determined by company financial situation. For 
external environment observation, we typically use porter five forces24 to define industry risk 
exposure which analyzes business cycle from supplier power, buyer power, threat of 
substitutes, barriers to entry, and rivalry. According to predictability industry trend, LBO 
companies could decide the scheduler of exit. 
 
2.3 Potential LBO firms 
The LBO candidates could be unlisted mature companies which already have stable market 
share, and company need to pay a lot of tax for income. According to the theory of trade off, 
the high debt ration would be the optimal choice for company due to tax shield. But Brealey 
& Myers (2003) concluded that the trade-off theory accepts that target debt ratios may vary 
                                                        
24 Porter's five forces analysis is a framework for the industry analysis and business strategy development developed by 
Michael E. Porter of Harvard Business School in 1979 . 
 16
from firm to firm25.A positive debt-equity ratio could be determined by evaluation of tax 
shields and costs of financial distress.   
 
But there is another kind of companies which could be the potential of LBO firm as well, and 
these candidates are normally the listed companies. Because company wants to diversify 
business divisions which are lacking of high quality management team and sufficient financial 
support, LBO could be a good choice for development in order to avoid antitrust legislation. 
During transaction, company would switch the listed to the unlisted situation. Thus their exit 
strategies are generally trade sale and shares repurchasing.  
 
In order to evaluate whether the firm has ability to fulfill the debt obligation, we should check 
the revenue of company which represents the capacity of cash generation. If the EBITDA 
(earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) was in situation of slumps, this 
company could not perform their debt payment well. Thus the company may face financial 
distress even bankruptcy.  
 
In Scandinavia, there are 6 primary investment criteria of the private equity26:  
 High (relative) market share (market leader position or strong follower) 
 High underlying market attractiveness 
 Strong management team and prudent business plan 
 Predictable cash flow 
 Potential need for growth capital 
 Restructuring and/ or growth opportunities 
 
2.4 Motivation for LBO       
Tax shield is one of the attractive reasons to LBO. Brealey & Myers (2003)27 mentioned the 
risk of the tax shields is equal to the interest payment, and then the present value of the tax 
                                                        
25 Brealey, R. A. & Myers, Stewart, C. (2003) Principles of Corporate Finance. 7th edition. The Irwin/McGraw-Hill series in 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate. Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, cop. ISBN: 0-07-294043-3. Ch. 4-6 
26 This primary investment criteria of PE is picked up from Jacob Andersson (2005) “An Insight to the dynamics of the 
Leveraged buyout” Master thesis, Copenhagen Business College. Jacob collected this information from among the key 
Nordic PE funds (CVC, EQT, Industri Kapital and Nordic Capital. (All information available on their respective websites.))  
27 Brealey, R. A. & Myers, Stewart, C. (2003) Principles of Corporate Finance. 7th edition. The Irwin/McGraw-Hill series in 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate. Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, cop. ISBN: 0-07-294043-3. Ch. 6 
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shield would be the corporate tax multiply with the amount of debt. Therefore, if company 
has more debt, they would gain more tax benefit which is following the theory of trade off. 
However, in fact, too much debt would bring high interest payment, and company would be 
much easier to meet financial distress or bankruptcy in this kind of capital structure unless the 
firm has excess debt capacity which is applicable for firms with safe cash flows and relatively 
low operating risk. Increased tax shield is always the core reason for adopting LBO since the 
seller could get more benefit form the selling price. On the other hand, debt financing is 
cheaper than equity financing due to Pecking order theory.  
 
Conglomerate discount is another important incentive which could provide sufficient financial 
support and high quality management team to company for business division development. 
As we know diversification of business could reduce the market risk for predictable earning, 
but some listed companies are afraid their small part divisions’ development would negatively 
affect the whole company value in stock market. Once company adopts LBO, the listed would 
be unlisted in order to avoid legislation interference. Brealey & Myers (2003)28 claimed that 
the market value of the whole conglomerate is less than the sum of the values of its parts. 
Leveraged buyout could help target firm to improve their individual division value.      
 
Free cash flow could be other reason to adopt LBO, because debt is cheaper financing which 
is following pecking order theory. Each company needs free cash flow to support new 
profitable project, when company is impossible to gain internal financing, debt will be the 
optimal choice due to cheaper cost. As we know, debt would decrease the agency costs of free 
cash flow, and increase tax shield. But high leveraged are always following high interest 
payment, manager will do the new project more considerate and thoughtful sine they bear 
much more pressure about free cash generation. Thus LBO not only provides sufficient 
financial support, it also incentives manger to put more diligence in their job.   
                                                        
28 Brealey, R. A. & Myers, Stewart, C. (2003) Principles of Corporate Finance. 7th edition. The Irwin/McGraw-Hill series in 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate. Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, cop. ISBN: 0-07-294043-3. Ch. 4-6 
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2.5 Successful factors for LBO  
How can we handle a successful LBO? It has to depend on some key factors: a prospect 
company, financial statement, management team, financiers, the exit strategy, and other 
exogenous factors. 
 
As we mention above, leveraged buyout is not suitable for every companies. The prospect 
firms of LBO only focus on mature companies who have steady cash flow generation but few 
profitable opportunities for long-term development. We also call this kind of company as cash 
cow.29 Then LBO candidates should be checked by financial statement, in order to figure out 
whether company has capability to fulfill debt obligation. Furthermore LBO target firm 
should hold tangible assets much more than intangible, because company with a lot of 
tangible assets could be gain more tax benefit from high debt capital structure, and tangible 
asset would be much easier to sell under any buyout intention.   
 
A qualified management team is another crucial factor for a successful LBO. Because 
managers’ diligence would positively affect company financial performance which is relative 
to sustain stable cash flow for high interest payment and debt obligation, fund conductor must 
require plenty of working experience, and professional knowledge. Otherwise, management 
team would lose their reputation from fund raisers, and it will be difficult to inject new capital. 
The selection of exit strategy is relative to managers’ diligence effect as well, there are many 
ways to exit LBO transaction which are flotation, trade sale, refinancing, going public again, 
and IPO. Then it is timing, managers should balance the view of internal and external 
environment to consider what the best time to implement exit strategy is, in order to reach the 
final victory.  
2.6 Negative impact of LBO  
Leveraged buyout is not perfect in the real life, although they are helping company to exploit 
their potential value. In this section, we have to talk about critique of LBO. 
 
                                                        
29 A cash cow is a business unit with a high market share in a mature market.  
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Leveraged buyout always needs a stable cash flow for interest payment and amortization on 
debt, so it may risk essential investment capital for long term strategy. Furthermore, LBO also 
needs an efficient team work to bring a positive impact on financial performance, it needs to 
handle well incentive problem within management team.  
 
Lloyd (1997) recorded 149 management buyout companies from 1979 to 1988 which was 
observed by Chiplin 30. You can see the table below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chiplin (1992) used yearly data to evaluate the long-term financial performance on 
management buyout companies. It showed fluctuation year by year, since each company 
considered to do better than the averaged of industry sector.  
“On averaged, buy-out firms performed better over the medium term (up to 3 years), but over 
the longer term (4-7 years) financial performance was worse than the industry average”.32 
                                                        
30 Lloyd, B. (1997) Creating value through acquisitions, demergers, buyouts and alliances. 1st edition. Oxford: Pergamon. 
ISBN: 0-08-043055-4.  pp.135 
31Chiplin, B., Wright, M., & Robbie, K. (1992) “U.K. Management buy-outs 1990-Brian Chiplin, Mike Wright and Ken 
Robbie, The centre for Management Buy-Out Research Unviersity of Nottingham”. Long Range Planning, Vol. 25, No 3,  
pp.124 
32 Lloyd, B. (1997) Creating value through acquisitions, demergers, buyouts and alliances. 1st edition. Oxford: Pergamon. 
ISBN: 0-08-043055-4. P137 
Table 1: UK management buyouts 1979-1988 
    
year Number value(million) average value (million) 
1979 18 14 0.8 
1980 36 28 0.8 
1981 145 193 1.3 
1982 238 348 1.5 
1983 233 364 1.6 
1984 238 403 1.7 
1985 261 1141 4.4 
1986 313 1181 3.8 
1987 345 3218 9.3 
1988 356 3755 10.5 
Source:CMBOR31     
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At the beginning of LBO transaction, fund manger would face pressure of financial 
performance since company only depends on free cash flow to serve debt obligation. Thus, 
fund mangers should have a clear view of company’s situation, strengthen strongpoint, and 
improve weakness. As we mention before, expiration date of PE funds is determined by 
company’s financial performance, and this certain investment period will be normally taken 
3-5 years. But if company could not reach target financial performance, LBO transaction 
would extend the date of management. In contrast, if fund mangers spend more effort to help 
company value creation, LBO transaction would gain return on the certain period. Extending 
the date of LBO transaction, company would be more pressure to face financial distress since 
the period of interest payment will be extended as well. Furthermore, long-term debt payment 
will increase risk of management since company should be more considerate and thoughtful 
to choose every new project in this variable economic environment. Therefore, manager’s 
effort would be the most important factor to influence result of LBO transaction, and their 
diligence process determines whether LBO transaction would be successful or not. If PE 
investment recruits wrong person who does not qualify as a fund managers to manage funds 
investment, it would be a negative impact of PE investment.  
 
After the buy out, most of companies just work on short-term cash flow generation since they 
hurry to decrease leveraged in capital structure. Therefore, they would often abandon some 
long-term profitable investment in order to cumulate current cash flow for the payment of 
debt. Then company will miss some important development opportunities for long-term, it is 
easily going into receivership. 
 
IPO would be one of important exit strategy which is suitable for mature privacy company. 
The first important factor is the scheduler of IPO which must be consistent with positive 
signal effect in financial market. Because many investors do not know the real condition of 
company, and they often collect information from financial annual report, media 
entertainment, or company announcements, there would be information asymmetric existing. 
If company issues IPO under the negative signal effect, company’s true value would be 
destroyed. Another factor is about financial support before IPO. As we mention before, fund 
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managers should report their performance to fund providers in order to acquire the second 
financing in LBO transaction. If fund providers found there is not any value creation in this 
investment, they would stop financing for the next period investment in order to avoid the 
threat of exit value. Just like Industri Kapital exited companies through IPO’s, which have 
been very unsuccessful and raised considerable media-debate about corporate raiders.33  
 
2.7 Partial Conclusion  
The character of leveraged buyout is high debt, thus high interest payment and debt 
repayment would motivate managers working hard for cash flow generation. Bank loan would 
be the primary financing in LBO transaction. Except for bank loan, there are Mezzanine debt 
and equity providers as well. Exit strategy is crucial to determine how much return will be 
acquired in this investment. Fund managers would identify the scheduler of exit from LBO 
investment which is based on company’s financial performance and industry environment. 
Exit strategies include IPO, trade sale, share repurchasing, and going public again, fund 
manager would determine specific strategy in terms of company’s condition. The prospect of 
LBO must be a mature company which has stable cash flow generation, tangible assets, and 
lots of taxable income to shield. These target companies adopt LBO transaction, because high 
debt financing would reduce tax payment due to tax shield, and it is cheaper than equity 
financing. Fund manager effort is the most important factor to influence benefit of LBO 
transaction, and high return reflects their diligence process. Meanwhile, fund manager should 
have unique perception of economic environment, and have plenty working experience, 
because LBO transaction would increase debt ratio within capital structure, and the high 
interest payment and debt repayment need managers’ efficient working plan to fulfill. Thus if 
PE investment does not recruit a right person to manage fund, LBO companies would much 
easier go to bankruptcy due to heavy interest and debt payment.   
 
                                                        
33 The Dagens Inustri news paper. 2004-8-12 
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Chapter 3: Capital Structure of LBO 
This chapter will discuss the capital structure in the LBO, including issues such as the 
debt-equity, trade- off, costs of financial distress and bankruptcy. This is complemented by 
existing research on the cost of distress.   
Leveraged buyout means high weight of debt within capital structure, increased tax shield and 
reduction of agency cost are the positive views of LBO. On the other hands, the high 
leveraged would be easy to lead to financial distress and bankruptcy. 
3.1 Modigliani & Miller 
In the first beginning, Modigliani & Miller (1958)34 explained that the company was 
independent of the financial structure, which were without tax shield on the interest payment 
and bankruptcy costs. But after five years study in this topic, they argued the existence of tax 
subsidies on interest payment would cause the value of the firm to raise with the amount of 
debt financing. Therefore, Modigliani & Miller (1963)35: 
 
“In real world problems of financial strategy, which are not fully comprehended within the 
framework of static equilibrium models, there is a “need for preserving flexibility” as will 
normally be implied by the maintenance by the corporation of a substantial reserve of 
untapped borrowing power” (from: Modigliani, F. & Miller, M. (1963) “Corporate income taxes and 
the cost of capital: A correction”. American Economic Review, (June), PP.442)      
 
We image a company which is full of debt in capital structure, thus management level would 
bear heavy pressure when they choose new project for business development. Because high 
debt induces high interest payment, company requires sustaining stable cash flow for its debt 
obligation. If company failed in investment project, they would be high probability to delay 
interest payment. Thus high debt capital structure often pushes company to work harder, such 
as a man is walking on the tightrope, he should play attention anytime, and otherwise he 
would fall accidently. LBO transaction would be much easier to motivate management level 
                                                        
34 Modigliani, F. & Miller, M. (1958) “The cost of capital, corporate finance and the theory of investment”. American 
Economic Review, Vol. 74, No. 4, Fall,  pp. 509-522 
35 Modigliani, F. & Miller, M. (1963) “Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: A correction”. American Economic 
Review, Vol. 53, No. 3, June,  pp. 433-443 
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working hard in order to avoid an extremely precarious situation.  
 
However, Jensen (1998)36 argued that the bankruptcy costs would be changed by fluctuation 
of future cash flow. That is opposed for M&M theory who thought the company value will be 
increased by tax shield, sometime high debt will induce high possibility of financial distress 
or bankruptcy. Interest and principal payment are obligations, thus if these obligations are not 
met, the ultimate distress is bankruptcy. In reality, the firm can not ignore bankruptcy cost 
when it has bankruptcy risk. The probability of bankruptcy has a negative effect on the value 
of the firm. So the optimal debt-equity ratio would be higher in a world with agency cost of 
equity than in a world without these costs.  
 
Fama and Miller (1972)37 also supported this idea: 
“At this point, there is little in the way of conceiving research, either theoretical or empirical, 
that explains the amounts of debt that firms do decide to have in their capital structure.” (from: 
Fama, E. F. & Miller, M. (1972) “The theory of finance”. Holt, Rhinehart and Winston. PP. 173) 
  
High debt financing would reduce free cash flow since company must do obligation for 
interest payment and debt repayment. The free cash flow hypothesis38 implies that debt 
reduce the opportunity for managers to waste resource. In fact, there are not companies with 
capital structure of 100% debt due to risk aversion.  
 3.2 Financial efficiency of leveraged  
High leverage capital structure could be promoted by increased tax shield and operational 
efficiency.   
 
Tax shield – direct effects  
                                                        
36 Jensen, M. (1998) Foundations of organizational strategy. Cambrigdge, Mass. USA: Harvard University Press, ISBN: 
067-464-3429. Ch. 12.  pp. 345-362  
37 Fama, E. F. & Miller, M. (1972) “The theory of finance”. Holt, Rhinehart and Winston. PP. 173  
38 “A manager can only pad his expense account if the firm has the cash flow to cover it. Thus, we might expect to see more 
wasteful activity in a firm with a capacity to generate large cash flows than in one with a capacity to generate only has 
recently attracted the attention of the academic community.” From The seminal article is Michael C. Jensen, “the agency 
costs of free cash flow: corporate finance and takeovers,” American Economic Review (May, 1986). P323-39  
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Tax shield can be a powerful incentive for LBO, because companies always have a lot of 
taxable income. High financial leveraged would bring the tax benefit, which regards to U.S. 
tax regulation: government provides subsidy for debt financing within company39. Tax shield 
is under the financial leveraged, so leveraged company would receive additional subsidy 
which doesn’t exist for unleveraged company.  
 
Management incentives – indirect effects  
Within LBO Company, fund raisers will work closely with the senior management of the 
business, who is supported and relied on efficiency improvement. If they are not able to 
perform well, they will be replaced for who can be appropriate incentives by a profit-related 
bonus. On the other hand, high Financial leveraged would push managers more efficient to 
create value due to debt payment. Thus, management will not only focus on revenue 
enhancement, but also the cost reduction.  
 
High revenues usually could be from more aggressive pricing, more effective marketing, 
re-designed product, and advanced market research, but these should consistently rely on high 
quality specialist management and industry expertise. About cost reduction, company should 
cut back working capital under the long-term strategy, don’t just for the current free cash flow. 
Generally, all these strategic decisions must base on manager’s diligence, which is involving 
in day-to-day management of company.  
Palepu, Healy and Bernard (2004) 40described about the characteristic of value-eroding due 
to managers’ performance: 
1. High ratios of general and administrative expenses and overheads to sales, (which should 
be compared to that of competitors) 
2. Significant new investments in unrelated areas. 
3. High levels of expected operating cash flows from pro forma income and cash flow 
statements. 
4. Poor management incentives to create additional shareholder value, evidenced by a weak 
linkage between management compensation and firm performance.  
                                                        
39 Ross & Stephen, A. (2005) “Corporate Finance” 7th ed. The McGraw-Hill/ Irwin series in finance, insurance, and real 
estate. ISBN: 007-282920-6. Ch 15.5,  PP. 419 
40 Palepu, Krishna, G., Healy, Paul, M., Bernard, & Victor, L. (2006) “Business analysis and valuation using financial 
statements” Ch. 6   
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3.3 Cash flow plays an important role 
We have been repeated many times about free cash flow in previous sections. It is not doubt 
that cash flow plays an extremely important role in LBO, since high debt is always with high 
interest payment. Except for this, free cash flow also needs to fulfill the principal payment. 
Company should sustain stable free cash flow generation to serve debt obligation, otherwise, 
they will face financial distress.  
 
The value of firm’s assets is always formed by the value of liabilities and the value of the 
equity, so the cash flows received from the firm’s asset, CF(A), must be equaled the cash flow 
to the firm’s creditors, CF(B), and equity investors, CF(S): CF(A)= CF(B)+ CF(S)41 
 
3.4 Cost of financial distress 
Brealey and Myers (2003)42 argued that cost of financial distress will appear when company 
could not fulfill payment to creditor or lost reputation. The costs of financial distress depend 
on the probability of distress and the magnitude of costs encountered if distress occurs. 
Typically, cost of financial distress is divided into direct cost and indirect cost, as Altman 
(1993)43 found that the direct cost and indirect cost of bankruptcy amount to approximately 
15% of predistress firm value for industrial firms and about 7% for retailers.  
 
Generally, companies predict the financial distress cost which should be based on the total 
market value before distress occurs.  So the firm’s pre-distress value is  
PDV = LCD + CDD + GVR ① 
Where: PDV = the predistressed value of the bankruptcy firm; LCD = the loss causing the 
distress; CDD = the firm’s cost of dealing with the distress; GVR = the gross value recovered 
by claims holders. 
 
                                                        
41This formula is based on balance sheet regulation, debt and equity must be equaled to the total asset of company.  
42 Brealey, R. A., Stewart, C. & Myers (2003) “Principles of Corporate Finance”  Ch. 4-6  
43 Altman, E. I. (1993) Defaulted bonds: demand, supply and performance. Financial analysis journal, Vol. 49, No 3, 
May/June,  pp. 55-61 
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Altman (1993) and Franks & Torous (1994)44 used this equation to estimate the PDV. 
However, this standpoint will ignore the beginning of distress happening, which can not be 
reflected on the financial report in time.   
 
Andrade & Kaplan (1998)45 researched that many companies are involved in financial 
distress due to leveraged buyout in 1980s, and they redefined the cost of financial distress. 
From the view of qualitative analysis, financial distress cost should include: cutting back 
working capital on consistent profitable investment, assets only accepted as partial payment 
for a new purchase, and cost form the delay of bankruptcy process. So we modify the 
equation ① as below:  
GVR = NVR + CRC ②    and     TDC = CDD + CRC ③ 
Which: NVR = the net value recovered by claims holders, CRC = claims holders’ cost of 
obtaining that recovery, TDC = the total bankruptcy- related cost borne by claims holders in 
dealing with bankruptcy.  
Then we substitute Equation ② and ③ into Equation ①, we can get : 
PDV = LCD + CDD + NVR + CRC →  PDV = LCD + TDC + NVR 
Direct cost of financial distress 
Direct cost of financial distress is from legislation, administration costs of liquidation.  
These costs are actually small as a percentage of firm value. If company achieves a good 
performance currently, the probability of bankruptcy would be small percentage, and the cost 
of bankruptcy would not be large part of firm value.   
 
Within this part of financial distress cost, the largest payment is for professional fee which is 
paid to the creditors’ committee’s legal counsel and certain other expense. Lubben (2000)46 
                                                        
44 Franks, J., & Torous, W. (1994) A comparison of financial restructuring is distress exchanges and Chapter 11 
reorganizations.  Journal of Financial Economics,Vol. 35,  pp. 349-370 
45 Andrade, G., & Kaplan, S. N. (1998) How costly is financial (Not Economic) distress? Evidence from highly leveraged 
transactions that became distressed. The journal of finance, Vol. 53, No. 5, October,  PP.1443-1493 
46 Lubben, S. J. (2000) “The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in 
Large Chapter 11 cases”. American Bankruptcy Law Journal, Vol. 74, No. 2, Fall,  pp. 509-522 
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estimated the averaged cost of legal fees along to be about 1.5 % of total assets for bankrupt 
firms. Furthermore, Warner (1977)47concluded the expected cost of bankruptcy: 
 
“Suppose, for example, that a given railroad picks a level of debt such that bankruptcy would 
occur on average once every 20 years (e.g. the probability of going bankrupt is 5 % in any 
given year). Assume that when bankruptcy occurs, the firm would pay a lump sum penalty 
equal to 3% of its now current market value…, the firm’s expected cost of bankruptcy is equal 
to fifteen one-hundredths of one percent of its now current market value.” (from: Warner, J.B. 
“Bankruptcy Cost: Some Evidence,” Journal of Finance, (May 1977) PP.126-135) 
 
Indirect cost of financial distress 
Though these indirect costs clearly exist, it is quite difficult to estimate them quantitatively. 
Bankruptcy affects customers and suppliers. Sales are frequently lost due to both fearing of 
impaired service and lost of trust. Cheng & McDonald (1996)48 explained that company will 
decrease the profit by reduction of market share, and they will face financial distress 
thereafter.  
 
However, the probability of financial distress increases rapidly with additional borrowing. We 
should be sure that company can get the benefits form tax shield. Otherwise, the profit will be 
eroded.      
3.5 Trade-off theory 
Trade-off theory is helping company to decide how much debt and equity should be financing 
in capital structure. They should estimate whether the target debt ratio will bring the tax 
benefit compared with interest payment.49 However, trade-off theory could not exactly 
measure firm’s debt structure, since intangible assets always rely on equity financing, and 
only tangible asset needs debt financing.    
 
                                                        
47 Warner, J.B. “Bankruptcy Cost: Some Evidence”. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 32, No. 2, May, PP.337-347 
48 Cheng, T., & McDonald, J. (1996) “Industry structure and ripple effect of bankruptcy announcements”. Financial Review, 
Vol. 31, No 4, November,  pp. 783-807 
49 Kraus, A. and Litzenberger, R.H. (1973) A State-Preference Model of Optimal Financial Leverage. The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 28, No 4, September,  pp. 911-922.  
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We have discussed the potential LBO candidate before, these target company should be 
mature, a lot of tangible assets, cash-cow business in the market-leading position, but with 
unfavorable opportunities for long-term development. Base on the analysis of trade-off theory, 
this kind of company could through high debt ratio to improve organization efficiency.      
3.6 Optimal debt structure 
Managers should choose the capital structure that they believe will have the highest firm 
value, because this capital structure will be most beneficial to firm’s stockholders.  
 
If a firm is considering issuing debt to buy back some of its equities, the amounts of share 
holders will be decreased. So the variability of EPS (Earning per share) increases, the risk 
increases, and the required return increases as well. In other words, any increases in EBI 
(Earning before interest) leads to a greater risk in EPS for the leveraged firm, because the 
increased earning is distributed over fewer shares.  
 
Although, debt reduces free cash flow, the firm must make interest and principal payment. 
The free cash flow hypothesis implies that debt would reduce the opportunity for managers to 
waste resources 
 
So the optimal debt structure should depend on business risk and the type of assets. We can 
estimate the situation of cash flow, degree of business risk and other specific measurement 
from firm.     
Chapter 4: Conclusion 
As we know, the target firm for LBO should be mature with stable cash flow, but few net 
present value investment opportunities. Through capital structure, we can clearly know 
whether a company could be a LBO target company or not. The situation of the cash flow is 
helping to distinguish cash-cow industry, which is a necessary condition for leveraged buyout 
candidate. Meanwhile, cash flow is relevant for the prediction of financial distress, which 
includes direct cost and indirect cost. Direct cost includes the legal cost, administration of 
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liquidation, and indirect cost is about credit crisis due to financial distress. Base on the cost 
forecast, we can minimize the uncertainty level in the future.  
 
Therefore, value creation in leveraged buyout is from operating improvement and utilization 
of assets of the company, which are direct drivers for LBO.  Meanwhile, the incentive of 
management is playing the role as indirect.  
 
Leveraged buyout mainly represents the private equity, and it can be seemed as an important 
financial technique during the business cycle. We think that the real primary driver of the 
private equity market will be the availability of investor capital and the attractiveness of 
expected return. A successful LBO not only needs suitable economic climate, but also 
concerns about the company internal factor.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30
Reference 
1. Altman, E. I. (1993) “Defaulted bonds: demand, supply, and performance, 1987-1992”. 
Financial Analysis Journal. Vol. 49, No 3,  pp.55-61 
2. Andrade, G., & Kaplan, S. N. (1998) “How costly is financial (Not Economic) distress? 
Evidence form highly leveraged transactions that became distressed”. The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 53, No 5, October,  pp.1443-1493   
3. Anonymous (2002) “BVCA sets fund raising guidelines”. European Venture Capital 
Journal, ISSN: 09541675, Feb 2002,  pp. 6  
4. Anonymous (2002) “Leveraged loans make slow recovery”. European Venture Capital 
Journal, ISSN: 09541675, Feb 2002,  pp. 6 
5. Agrawal, A. & Mandelker, G. (1990) “Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of 
Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments”. Journal of Financial & 
Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 25, No 2, June, pp.143-161 
6. Borokhovich, K., Brunarski, K., & Parrino, R. (1997) “CEO Contracting and 
Antitakeover Amendments”. The journal of finance. Vol. 52, No 4, September,  
pp.1495-1517 
7. Cheng, T., & Mc Donald, J. (1996) “Industry structure and ripple effect of bankruptcy 
announcements”. Financial Review, Vol. 31, No 4, November,  pp. 783-807. 
8. Chiplin, B., Wright, M., & Robbie, K. (1992) “U.K. Management buy-outs 1990-Brian 
Chiplin, Mike Wright and Ken Robbie, The centre for Management Buy-Out Research 
Unviersity of Nottingham”. Long Range Planning, Vol. 25, No 3,  pp.124 
9. Cuny, C. & Talmor, E. (2007) “A theory of private equity turnarounds”. Journal of 
Corporate finance, Vol. 13, No 4,  pp. 629-646. 
10. DeAngelo, H. & Rice, E. (1983) “Antitakeover Charter Amendments and Stockholder 
Wealth”. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11, No 1-4, April, pp. 329-59 
11. Engleman, K. & Cornell, B. (1988) “Measuring the costs of corporation litigation: Five 
case studies”. Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 17, No 2, October, pp. 377-399 
12. Fenn, G., Liang, N., & Prowse, S. (1995) “The Economics of the Private Equity Market”.  
Paper provided by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U. S.) in its series 
 31
Staff studies with number 168.  
13. Franks, J., & Torous, W. (1994) “A comparison of financial restructuring is distress 
exchanges and Chapter 11reorganizations”. Journal of financial Economics, Vol. 35,  pp. 
349-370 
14. Fung, W., & Hsieh, D. (2006) “Hedge Funds: An Industry in Its Adolescence”. Economic 
Review. Feberal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Fourth Quarter. pp. 1-34 
15. Garvey, G. & Hanka, G. (1999) “Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of 
Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage”. Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No 2, April,  pp. 
519-46 
16. Czerwinski, S. J. (2000) “Small Business: Expectations of Firms in SBA’s 8(a) program 
are not being met”. United States General Accounting Office, GAO/T-RCED-00-261,    
July 20.  pp. 1-17 
17. Hoyem, G. &Yen, R. (2007) “Catch a ride on the tech buyout wave”. Venture Capital 
journal, No 8, pp. 33-34. 
18. Kraus, A. & Litzenberger, R. H. (1973) “A State-Preference Model of Optimal Financial 
Leverage”. Journal of Finance,Vol. 28, No 4, September,  pp. 911-922 
19. Linn, S. & McConnell, J. (1983) “An empirical investigation of the impact of 
‘anti-takeover’ amendments on common stock prices”. Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol. 11, No. 1-4,  pp. 361-399. 
20. Lubben, S. J. (2000) “The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical 
Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 cases”. American Bankruptcy Law 
Journal, Vol. 74, No. 4, Fall,  pp. 509-522 
21. Modigliani, F. & Miller, M. (1958) “The cost of capital, corporate finance and the theory 
of investment”. The American Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, June,  pp.261-297 
22. Modigliani, F. & Miller, M. (1963) “Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: A 
Correction”. An American Review, Vol. 53, No. 2, June,  pp.433-443 
23. Myers, S. (2001) “Capital Structure”. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 
2, Spring,  pp. 81-102.  
24. Prowse, S. D. (1998) “The economics of the private equity market”. Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas, Economic Review the 3rd Quarter 1998, ISSN: 07321414,  pp.21-35 
 32
25. Shleifer, A. & Robert, W. (1997) “A Survey of Corporate Governance”. The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 52, No. 2, June,  pp. 737-783 
26. Vinten, F. & Thomsen, S. (2008) “A Review of Private Equity.” Working Paper no. 1, 
Copenhagen Business School. 
27. Warner, J. B. (1977) “Bankruptcy cost: some evidence”. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 32, 
No. 2, May,  pp.337-347  
Books: 
1. Brealey, R. A. & Myers, Stewart, C. (2003) Principles of Corporate Finance. 7th edition. 
The Irwin/McGraw-Hill series in Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate. Boston: 
McGraw-Hill/Irwin, cop. ISBN: 0-07-294043-3. Ch. 4-6  
2. Fama, E. F. & Miller, M. (1972) The theory of finance. Holt, Rhinehart and Winston. Ch. 4,  
pp.145- 187 
3. Fraser-Sampson, G., (2007) Private Equity as an Asset Class. 1st edition. The Wiley 
Finance Series. Chichester. : Wiley, J. & Sons, incop. ISBN: 9-780-4700-6645-4  
4. Greve J. (1990) How to do a leveraged buyout. 3rd edition, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, Cop. ISBN: 0-13-404906-3. Ch. 7-12.  
5. Jensen, M. (1998) Foundations of organizational strategy. Cambrigdge, Mass. USA: 
Harvard University Press, ISBN: 067-464-3429. Ch. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 & 12.  pp. 153- 300 & 
pp. 345-362 
6. Lloyd, B. (1997) Creating value through acquisitions, demergers, buyouts and alliances. 
1st edition. Oxford: Pergamon. ISBN: 0-08-043055-4.  pp. 137 & PP.135 
7. Loos, N. (2006) Value Creation in Leveraged Buyouts: analysis of factors driving private 
equity investment performance. 2nd edition. Germany: Deutscher University-Verlag.   
ISBN10: 3-8350-0488-3 or ISBN13: 9-78-3-8350-0488-7.  Ch. 4-6.  pp. 89-390 
8. Logue A. (2007) Hedge Funds for Dummies. 1st edition. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley. ISBN13: 
978-0-470-04927-3 or ISBN10: 0-470-04927-8. Ch. 10-14.  
9. Ogden, J. (2002) Advanced corporate finance: policies and strategies. 1st edition.  Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, cop. ISBN: 0-13-091568-8. Ch. 16.  pp. 571  
 33
10. Palepu, Krishna, G., Healy, Paul, M., Bernard, & Victor, L. (2004) Business analysis and 
valuation using financial statements. Mason, Ohio: Thomson/South-Western. ISBN: 
0-32-411894-5.  Ch. 6  
11. Povaly, S. (2007) Private Equity Exits: divestment process management for leveraged 
buyout. 1st edition. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. ISBN: 
9-78-3-540-70953-4. Ch. 2-5,  pp. 15-366 
Thesis: 
1. Andersson, J. (2005) An Insight to the Dynamics of the Leveraged Buyout. Master Thesis, 
Copenhagen Business College. 
2. Blom, M., Kadiri, Y., & Stendahl, D. (2004) Factors influencing the internationalization 
of Swedish Private Equity Firms. Master Thesis, Lund University. 
3. Wilmes, R. (2007) Choosing the best Private Equity fund. Master Thesis, Lund 
Unversity. 
Internet Source: 
1. Bary, A. (2007), “The month of reckoning”. Barron’s, September 3, 2007.  
    http://online.barrons.com/article/SB118860639155915293.html  [viewed 11/04/2008]. 
2. Cuff, Daniel F. (1989), “Business People: Deal for Prime Pleases Partners at Whitney”. 
New York Times, June 26, 1989. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/26/business/business-people-deal-for-prime-pleases-pa
rtners-at-whitney.html?sec=&spon=  [viewed 11/04/2008]. 
3. Kinn, B. A. & Zaff, A. M. (2001), “VCs Tap New Funding Source: The SBIC Equity 
Leverage Program and the Reasons for Its Growing Popularity”. Venture Capital Journal, 
July 1, 2001 
http://www.foleyhoag.com/~/media/Files/Publications/Generic/VC%20s%20Tap%20New
%20Funding%20Source%20%20%20Kinn.ashx [viewed 16/05/2008] 
4. Kirsner, Scott. (2008), “Venture capital's grandfather”. The Boston Globe, April 6, 2008. 
    http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2008/04/06/venture_capitals_grandfather/ 
 34
[viewed 11/04/2008]. 
5. Oppel JR. R. A. (1999) “Benno C. Schmidt, Financier, Is Dead at 86”. New York Times, 
October 22, 1999 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/22/business/benno-c-schmidt-financier-is-dead-at-86. 
ml [viewed 16/05/2008] 
6. Thornton, E., Grover, R. & Lowry, T. (2004) “Those Bulging Buyouts; LBO firms are 
getting bolder, thanks to the strong economy and cheap money”. Business Week, Feb. 9, 
pp. 74. ISSN: 07398395 
http://proquest.umi.com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/pqdlink?did=541115891&Fmt=7&clientId=536
81&RQT=309&VName=PQD [viewed 16/05/2008] 
7. “The New Kings of Capitalism, Survey on the Private Equity industry” The Economist, 
November 25, 2004 
http://www.economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=3398496 [viewed 16/05/2008] 
8.  N. Y. / Region (2000) “Metro Business; A Change of Identity for J. H. Whitney”. New 
York Times, June 14, 2000.   
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/14/nyregion/metro-business-a-change-of-identity-for-j 
h-whitney.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/People/S/Sherman,%20Michael 
[viewed 16/05/2008] 
 
9.  http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/privateequity.asp (development of private equity) 
10.  http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/Private_equity  (introduction of Private equity)  
11. http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/Leveraged_Buyout (introduction of LBO) 
12. http://vcexperts.com/vce/library/encyclopedia/documents_view.asp?document_id=15 
Joseph W. Bartlett, "What Is Venture Capital?" 
13. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_private_equity_and_venture_capital 
14. http://www.whitney.com/history.html 
 35
Lecture Note: 
Andersen, T. K. (2008) Buyout Transaction. Merc. Private equity and Hedge fund. 
Copenhagen of University. 25th May 2008 
 
